

18 August 1959

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

**Robert E. Cushman**  
**Brigadier General, USMC**  
**Assistant to the Vice President**  
**The Capitol**

**The Director thought the  
Vice President might be interested  
in reading the attached information**



25X1



**Executive Officer**

25X1

**Attachment:**

**Text quoted in**



**Distribution:**

**Original - Addressee w/att**

**1 - DCI**

**1 - ER**


**1 - JSE w/att**

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"Gomulka is the provincial type and Communist to the toes. The welcome and reception given Nixon by the man in the street shocked him. He feels that he has managed pretty well since 1956 and apparently thought that he had won some genuine sympathy and support for his policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. He was encouraged in this by the satisfactory, if not overwhelmingly enthusiastic, reception given Khrushchev. Then along comes Nixon, and without any of the preparations made for the Khrushchev visit, there is this huge demonstration, all of it pro-American. You can imagine the effect of such a thing on a narrow fellow like Gomulka. You can also imagine how Stalinist regimes such as the DDR and Czechoslovakia will exploit it. And now of course Gomulka will have to invite Eisenhower -- he has no choice. And of course it will be worse than Nixon's. The only out that the regime can use is the argument that it is keeping up its ties with the West, which is always pleasant listening for the Poles. There are some in the middle echelons of the Party who say that the Poles are trying to be within the Socialist Bloc what the British are within NATO. That's a bit far-fetched, but they can certainly do more than any of the other eastern countries."

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